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ABSTRACT 
 
This article contributes to the financial literature by investigating the motivations of Public to 
Private transactions in an international perspective (Europe, USA and Asia). We consider seven 
main possible motivations: tax savings, incentive realignment, control, free cash-flow, growth of 
prospects, takeover defense and undervaluation. Our empirical findings suggest that low growth 
prospects, low liquidity and high free cash-flow are the three main motivations for a Public to 
Private transactions. However, regions show some particularities such as importance of family 
block-holders in Europe and importance of the level of taxation in Asia.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
n the recent years, we have observed a trend of companies to leave the stock exchange, this 
phenomenon is designed by public to private (PtoP1). This trend has been such that Jensen (1989) 
foresaw the end of listed companies. In the USA, much research has been developed to study public to 
private transactions. It is also the case in Europe and more precisely in the United Kingdom. The aim of this paper is 
to understand the motivations of PtoP transactions. To this end, we examine the main determinants of both economic 
and corporate governance that may affect the decision for a firm to be delisted. The contribution of the paper is to 
offer the first international empirical investigation of going private transactions over the period 2000 – 2010. The 
results are expected to enable us to determine the main factors for firms to go private in different geographical areas.  
 
We focus on seven main possible reasons: tax savings, incentive realignment, control, free cash-flow, 
growth of prospects, takeover defense and undervaluation. Towards this end, we make use of parametric and non-
parametric tests applied to two samples, one of PtoP transactions and another which represents the control sample. 
At the end, we will be able to determine the profile of all Public to Private transactions for each geographical area.  
 
We first describe the main possible determinants that lead firms to go private in order to present the 
hypotheses. Then we present our sample and methodology. Our sample is composed of the USA, Europe (France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom) and Asia (North, Center and South). We have 
retained 535 transactions from 2000 to 2010. This sample represents 82%2 of the world population of PtoP. The 
control sample is determined by including different criteria (the technique of pairing): the size measured by the 
amount of sales, the same location, the same business sector and the stock quotation. The number of companies is 
identical to the sample of PtoP. Several databases are used to determine the two samples: OSIRIS, ORBIS, and 
Thomson One Banker.  
                                                
1 Note that in American literature, the term joint PtoP and LBO is often used. Indeed, as the PtoP, LBOs are financed largely by debt. The 
distinction between the two is explained in terms of composite mode of financing the debt: for example, PtoP with more than 50% debt financing 
of the LBO debt. The distinction is quite subtle, we should analyze the financial structure of each company, which is extremely difficult, which is 
why PtoP and LBO can be used simultaneously. When we employ LMBO, we refer to  the redemption of society made by its management team. 
2 Source: Thomson One Banker. 
I 
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Our findings reveal that the typical profile of public to private transaction is composed of low managerial 
share, low representation of control blocks, significant cash-flow, weak growth outlook, an undervaluation of the 
company and low liquidity. Moreover, some characteristics of geographical areas seem to be relevant. For example, 
in Europe, family block-holder has an important role whereas it does not play a significant role in the USA. In Asia, 
the level of taxation is important.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main possible motivations of 
Public to Private transactions. Section 3 describes the construction of the database and the methodology used. 
Section 4 presents the results of the univariate and multivariate analyses. Section 5 discusses results for each 
motivation. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
 
The main driver for value creation in Public to Private transactions resulted from a more efficient and 
effective management after the transaction. Indeed, the manager has to deal with huge levels of debt and very often 
also holds a big stake in the firm, which gives him incentives to work hard and to generate large cash-flows. This 
idea is tested in the following hypotheses.  
 
2.1 Tax Saving 
 
In general, we remark a massive use of debt for Public to Private transactions. This loan can offer the 
necessary money to realize the montage. It has two particular goals: on the one hand it allows the firm to realize the 
transaction and on the other hand it allows a tax deduction through interest on loan which is an important source of 
wealth (Lowenstein, 1985). This deduction can pay the debt and the remuneration for the shareholders via premium. 
For the period from 1980 to 1986, Kaplan (1989b) estimated that the tax saving of PtoP in the United States is 
between 21 and 72% of premiums paid to shareholders to take a company that withdraws from the listing market. 
Although this tax benefit is available to purchasers of the company, it is the shareholders of the target company who 
benefit the most through the premiums that are paid. Consequently, the wealth of shareholders of Public to Private is 
positively correlated with an important rate of taxation. Two variables measure the tax saving: taxation (the level of 
taxation) and gearing (financial debt/shareholder funds).  
 
H1: Companies that benefit low leverage of pre-transaction and important rate of taxation are more likely to leave 
the quotation.  
 
The main driver for value creation in these transactions resulted from a more efficient and effective 
management after the transaction. Indeed, the manager has to deal with huge levels of debt and very often also holds 
a big stake in the firm, which gives him incentives to work hard and to generate large cash-flows. To define the 
hypotheses we test, we explicitly base the following discussion on our previous work, Sannajust (2010). 
  
2.2 Incentive Realignment 
 
“The views from Adam Smith (1776), Berle & Means (1932) on the divergence of interests between 
managers and shareholders are formalized by Jensen & Meckling (1976). In this model, when a manager assigns a 
portion of its receivables to outside investors, the marginal costs of pecuniary benefits reduce only a fraction. 
Finally, manager increases his private interests which decrease the value of the firm. The private equity firms have 
many mechanisms for reward good managers for their good performance when they engage in a public to private 
transaction (Fenn, Liang & Prowse, 1995). Private Equity firms (the principal) try to realign the interests of 
managers (agents) with them. The hypothesis of realignment of interest says that the wealth of shareholders of a 
PtoP is largely the result of a system to meet the interests of the agent and principal” (Sannajust, 2010). 
 
As we noticed is that “the reunification of ownership and control will improve the incentive structure and is 
expected to increase managerial effort to maximize firm value. However, the effects of the realignment hypothesis of 
interest at a high level of managerial participation are contested because of the entrenchment effect (Morck, 
Schleifer & Visny, 1998; McConnel & Servaes, 1990) that may prevent or delay restructuring leaders and also the 
restructuring of the company (Franks, Mayer & Renneboog, 2001)” Sannajust (2010). 
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We use a dummy variable (managerial ownership) which is equal to 1 if the managers hold more 25% of 
share of the company.  
 
H2: Companies whose interest’s actors diverge are more likely to delist.  
  
2.3 Control 
 
“Easterbrook & Fischel (1983), Grossman & Hart (1988) explained why shareholders in individual 
companies with dispersed ownership can underinvest in monitoring (the problem of free-rider). After an LBO 
(leveraged buyout), the property of the company is much more concentrated by giving stronger incentives for 
investors (the principal) and more information to invest in monitoring management (Maug, 1998; Admati,). 
Furthermore, in judging the viability and success of acquisitions famous, DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L. & Rice 
(1984) argued that investors may have a comparative advantage in the monitoring task (Fenn et al., 1995). By this, it 
means that the public to private transaction can create value by solving the problem of free-rider on the control of 
managers (the agent)” (Sannajust, 2010). 
 
We can argue that “The hypothesis of control argues that the wealth obtained by shareholders depends 
largely on the outcome of the supervision system imposed by the management team in place. Although the literature 
on agency costs provides three sources for the wealth of public to private transaction, this practice is difficult to 
make. Lowenstein (1985) explained this fact with the theory of the stick and the carrot: carrot represents the increase 
shares that managers hold allowing them to enjoy more benefits. The stick is when companies use a massive debt 
forcing them to reduce benefits that previously were bunched managers in order to manage the company effectively 
avoiding bankruptcy (Cotter & Peck, 2001)” (Sannajust, 2010). 
 
We consider that “Control” is divided into three parts:  
 
(1) Institutional Block-holder: this variable is equal to 1 when this block-holder has at least 5% of share of 
capital otherwise it is 0. 
(2) Corporation Block-holder: this variable is equal to 1 when this block-holder has at least 5% of share of 
capital otherwise it is 0. 
(3) Family Block-holder: this variable is equal to 1 when this block-holder has at least 5% of share of capital 
otherwise it is 0.  
 
H3: Companies whose capital is dispersed are more likely to delist. 
 
2.4 Free Cash-Flow 
 
“Jensen (1986) defined free cash-flow as “cash-flow in surplus from which is required to fund all projects 
that have a positive net present value”. In using empirical results on executive pay and performance companies 
made by Murphy (1985), Jensen argued that managers have incentives to keep resources and to increase the firms 
beyond its optimal size, hence the name “empire building” which represents the direct conflict with the interests of 
shareholders. In exchanging debt cons of capital across highly leveraged, credible managers pay their future free 
cash-flow instead of retaining their own interest in project with a negative net present value (Jensen, 1986). 
However, linking debt and motivation of managers can lead to results in significant agency costs (Calcagno & 
Renneboog, 2007)” (Sannajust 2010). 
 
Free Cash-flow is used to study this hypothesis: the level of Free Cash-flow is approximated by operating 
income before depreciation and amortization minus tax, interest and dividend payments (Lehn & Poulsen, 1989).  
 
H4: Companies with strong Free Cash-flow are more likely to delist.  
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2.5 Growth Prospects 
 
“Another analysis was conducted on growth prospects for public to private transactions. According to 
Jensen (1986), companies that have low growth prospects appear as potential candidates to withdraw from the stock 
quote because they imply a weak management and decision making suboptimal. Lehn & Poulsen (1989) also 
confirmed that the companies withdrew from the quotation, have low prospects growth. A variable measuring 
growth prospects has been found with the ratio of Tobin (Q of Tobin) which measures the relationship between the 
market value of the firm and replacement cost of assets. A low ratio indicates low growth prospects and significant 
agency costs whereas a large value indicates substantial growth prospects and lower agency costs” (Sannajust, 
2010). 
 
We use Q ratio as the variable to estimate growth prospects. It is defined as market capitalisation deflated 
by total assets.  
 
H5: Companies with low growth prospects are more likely to leave the quotation.  
  
2.6 Takeover Defense 
 
“Another reason which may lead to the launch of a public to private transaction is the fear of being 
redeemed. Lowenstein (1985) noted that for many companies that withdraw (Management Buy-Outs, MBO), it is a 
strategic defence against a final hostile offer to shareholders or cons of bidding. For fear of losing their jobs, 
managers prefer to leave the exchange. Moreover, when managers have a very important part in corporate capital, it 
is unlikely to be bought by others (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). However, maintain control of society can lead 
managers to find themselves in a difficult situation because they have invested their entire personal wealth in society 
(Halpern, Kieschnick & Rotenberg, 1999; Hubbard & Palia, 1995). Numerous studies have analysed this case” 
(Sannajust, 2010). 
 
Some examples can be quoted: 
  
“In UK, Kennedy & Limmack (1996) found that 40.14% of companies redeemed in the form of traditional 
buyouts, have replaced their CEO in the first year following the takeover and 25.7% did so during the second year. 
In the USA, Martin & McConnel (1991) found that 41.9% of teams’ leaders leave their jobs in the first year of 
transaction. Therefore, an MBO protects the leaders of this phenomenon. Management takes a large share of the 
company in order to hedge against any possible hostile takeover. This hypothesis of protection against a hostile 
takeover suggests that premiums reflect the fact that the management team may have the intention to repurchase 
shares from other shareholders to protect itself against an unsolicited takeover bid” (Sannajust, 2010). 
 
We use a dummy variable (Prior Takeover Defence) which is equal to 1 when the firm faces takeover one 
year before going private. 
 
H6: Companies which have been the subject of a partial takeover are more likely to delist.  
 
2.7 Undervaluation 
 
“As a firm represents a “portfolio” (Kieschninck, 1989), there are informational asymmetries between 
managers and outside investors regarding the maximizing of the value of corporate assets (Roll, 1977; Lehn, Netter 
& Poulsen, 1990). However, it is impossible for managers who have private information to realize that share price of 
the company is undervalued compared to the real potential of the latter. This problem may be exacerbated when the 
listed companies, mostly small, have difficulties in the finance market to grow, which is difficult to attract the 
interest of investors. This lack of interest for these companies creates a lack of liquidity and involves a reduction in 
the value of the company which leads to exit the stock exchange (Mehran & Peristinami, 2006)” (Sannajust, 2010). 
 
We can make a reference from Lowenstein (1985) who explained that when managers represent the main 
part in control of the company, they can use specific methods in terms of technical and financial accounting to 
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depreciate the stock price before the announcement (Schadler & Karns, 1990). By manipulating the dividends, they 
refuse to meet analysts because managers use the asymmetry information to their advantage (Sannajust, 2010). 
 
“DeAngelo (1986) found no evidence in terms of manipulations that could be performed by managers. 
However, Harlow & Howe (1993), Kaestner & Liu (1996) confirmed that in the case of MBO, there are important 
stock purchases made before going private.. The hypothesis of undervaluation suggests that the wealth obtained by 
the shareholders is from the undervaluation of corporate assets. Moreover, for investors, the increasing of liquidity 
in integrated shares of the company is a key factor for listed companies (Amihud & Mendelson, 1988). Conversely, 
the listed company with small market shares will have low liquidity and financial problems and they will have to 
remain listed. They will consider as real targets. Therefore, firms in quotation which have low financial perspective 
and low liquidity will have a high probability to delist and to become private” (Sannajust, 2010). 
 
We use two variables: first, PER (Price Earnings Ratio) to estimate the undervaluation and second, liquidity 
(assets minus stock divided to financial debt).  
 
H7: Companies which are undervalued or have low liquidity are more likely to delist. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Sample Control: Methodology And Statistics 
 
For our analysis, we need a PtoP sample as well as a sample control which is composed of listed 
companies. To construct this sample control, we employ a specific method, the technique of pairing: three 
parameters are retained: i. the size (measured either by turnover or total assets), ii- the location (firms have to be 
located in the same area activity), and iii. the stock quotation (firms have to be listed at least a year). The choice of 
this technique is justified by the fact that it allows to assess the probability of occurrence of an event and 
differentiate firms in Public to Private companies to remain listed. The development of the control sample is 
performed based on three essential characteristics: business sector and the amount of sales and period:  
 
• Business sector: this category includes major business areas of the company. This allows us to consider, 
first, the life cycle industrial and secondly, between the particular industries in terms of financial structures. 
The database Thomson One Banker provides SIC sector code, the pairing was done using it. In most cases, 
firm control sample, that is to say the firm control, was selected by referring to the first two digits of SIC 
code.  
• The amount of sales: it is a criteria representative of the size factor. We make the hypothesis that the local 
asset is a good indicator of company size in the sense that it includes all investors industrial, commercial 
and financial. Moreover, the choice of this criterion allows us to avoid the bias with the difference in size 
between firms in the same sector of activity and take the fact that SMEs do not have the same behavior as 
the major companies. Therefore, the firms listed have been selected, that is to say “firms witnesses”, and 
should have the nearest total assets to those the company studied. To make this control sample, a rigorous 
methodology must be respected. We based on a methodology that has already been applied by several 
authors, such as Weir and al. (2005). 
• The period: economic conditions are important so we match the control sample in relation to the same year 
as firm in the PtoP sample.  
 
Moreover, a final test is performed to verify if all the firms selected of our control sample remained listed 
at least two years after the announcement of a going private. Our sample consists of 535 companies: 102 in Europe, 
153 in the United Kingdom, 209 in the United States and 71 in Asia.  
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3.2 Analysis 
 
3.2.1. Presentation Of The Methodology 
 
Our statistical analysis is performed using two samples:  
 
• Sample 1: it includes all the PtoP from 2000 to 2010 for Europe, the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Asia. The number of companies amounted to 535.  
• Sample 2 called control sample, it consists of companies that are remained publicly traded from 2000 to 
2010 for the four geographical areas. A methodology is followed to fully optimize the development of this 
sample (company size, industry…). The number of companies is identical to the sample 1. For the control 
sample, we used ORBIS which brings together financial data from annual reports listed companies. Thus 
all the variables selected were identified for both samples. 
 
3.2.2. Parametric Test 
 
Before using the difference in means test, three precautions should be taken:  
 
• Ensure that the distribution of the sample is consistent with the hypothesis Gaussian distribution of the 
variable (normality test). 
• Check the homogeneity of variances of all samples. 
• Check the size of the sample (over 30).  
 
The three stages have been completed; we apply the t-statistics for all samples. Applying the test of 
differences in means can be realized. It aims to whether the means of the variables of the two samples are 
significantly different.  
 
3.2.3 Non-Parametric Test 
 
We also use a non-parametric test, Wilcoxon test, also called sign test and rank, in order to compare 
characteristics of two distributions. This test is an alternative non-parametric test of t-Student we just presented. The 
Wilcoxon test is based only on the order comments on the two samples. It also helps to provide some response to 
relevant issues such as "the shape of the distribution is identical?”, "is there a significant difference between the 
central tendencies of two distributions?”. It takes into account both the rank and signs of each element in the sample 
and not based on any assumption regarding the probability distribution. 
 
3.2.4 The Logit Model 
 
Our model is presented in the following form: 
 𝑍 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑇 + 𝛽!𝐺 + 𝛽!𝑀 + 𝛽!𝐼 + 𝛽!𝐶 + 𝛽!𝐹 + 𝛽!𝐹𝐶𝐹 + 𝛽!𝑄 + 𝛽!𝑃𝑇𝐼 + 𝛽!"𝑃𝐸𝑅 + 𝛽!!𝐿 + 𝑒  (1) 
 
Table 1 shows the different variables used in the model and their respective definitions. All data for 
variables were taken one year before the release of the award of the company which is the last year before delisting.  
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Table 1: Variables 
Names Variables Definitions 
T Taxation Amount of taxation (in percentage) 
G Gearing Leverage: ratio between financials debt to shareholder funds 
M Managerial ownership Managerial ownership (1: when the equity held by managers represents over 25% of shares of the company; 0: otherwise) 
I Institutional block-holder 1: when the share of institutional shareholders is at least equal to 5% of shares of the company; 0: otherwise 
C Corporation block-holder 1: when the share of corporation shareholders is at least equal to 5% of shares of the company; 0: otherwise 
F Family block-holder 1: when the share of family shareholders is at least equal to 5% of shares of the company; 0: otherwise 
FCF Free cash-flow It is approximated by operating income before depreciation and amortization minus tax, interest and dividend payments (Lehn & Poulsen, 1989). 
Q Q ratio Q ratio: is defined as market capitalisation deflated by total assets 
Q1/Q2 Q1/Q2 Q1/Q2: the Q ratio in the year before going private (at the last published accounts) divided by the Q ratio in the previous year 
Q1/Q3 Q1/Q3 Q1/Q3: the Q ratio in the year before going private divided by the Q ratio two years before 
LQ*HFCF Low Q ratio * high free cash-flow 
LQ*HFCF: is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm had below 
median Q and above median free cash-flow and zero otherwise 
SIZE Ln (Sales) Ln (Sales) 
PTI Prior takeover interest Prior takeover interest: a dummy variable which equals 1 if there has been any takeover interest in the year leading up to the PTP announcement  
PER Price earning ratio Price earning ratio 
L Liquidity Ratio of assets less stock on financial debt 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this section, we present our empirical findings region by region. 
 
4.1 Europe 
 
In panel A, we note that the structure of ownership and control for public to private companies in Europe is 
largely composed of managers and the family block-holder (Andres, 2008; Faccio and Lang, 2002). The result can 
be explained by the European Industrial which composes of nearly 90% of SMEs.  
 
In panel B, we observe that the undervaluation, the growth prospects and the level of liquidity are three 
elements which characterize highly PtoP deals. Indeed, the data reveal that the growth prospects of the company 
measured by the Q ratio are much lower for the PtoP belonging to the control sample (0.83 against 1.45). 
Underpricing is another criterion that qualifies the PtoP. The results are suggestive, 15 for PtoP cons 27 for Control 
Sample (CS). Similarly, the lack of liquidity is also part of criteria that characterize PtoP from other companies.  
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Table 2: Results for Europe (102 observations) 
Variables PtoP Mean Median SC Mean Median t value z statistic 
Panel A: Property and Control 
Managerial Ownership 0,65 1 0,85 1 -2,682*** -2,679*** 
Institutionnal Block-holder 0,61 1 0,75 1 -2,697*** -2,643*** 
Corporate Block-holder 0,58 1 0,72 1 -2,791*** -2,728*** 
Family Block-holder 0,64 1 0,84 1 -2,904*** -2,876*** 
Takeover Defence 0,56 1 0,52 1 1,036 1,123 
       
Panel B: Performance 
Taxation 1,21 1,17 1,18 1,08 1,026 1,103 
Gearing 1,42 1,38 1,45 1,39 -1,115 -1,112 
Free Cash-flow 4,55 4,43 3,77 3,70 2,169** 2,214** 
Q ratio 0,83 0,81 1,45 1,42 -3,987*** -3,521*** 
Q1/Q2 0,91 0,87 1,05 1,03 -3,362*** -3,214*** 
Q1/Q3 0,86 0,85 1,12 1,09 -3,556*** -3,514*** 
LQ*HFCF 0,37 0,25 0,24 0,16 2,105** 2,034** 
PER 15,14 14,52 26,78 25,92 -2,412** -2,376** 
Liquidity 1,45 1,38 2,09 1,96 -2,654*** -2,698*** 
PtoP : Public to Private ; SC : Sample Control 
Notation: ***, **, * represent significance level up to 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 
Taxation: amount of taxation (%); Gearing: ratio between financials debt to shareholder funds, 
Managerial ownership: 1: when the equity held by managers represents over 25% of shares of the company; 0: 
otherwise; Institutional block-holder: 1: when the share of institutional shareholders is at least equal to 5% of 
shares of the company; 0: otherwise; Corporation block-holder: 1: when the share of corporation shareholders is at 
least equal to 5% of shares of the company; 0: otherwise; Family block-holder: 1: when the share of family 
shareholders is at least equal to 5% of shares of the company; 0: otherwise; Free Cash-flow: It is approximated by 
operating income before depreciation and amortization minus tax, interest and dividend payments (Lehn & Poulsen, 
1989); Q ratio: market capitalisation deflated by total assets; Q1/Q2: Q ratio in the year before going private (at the 
last published accounts) divided by the Q ratio in the previous year; Q1/Q3: Q ratio in the year before going private 
divided by the Q ratio two years before; LQ*HFCF: is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm had 
below median Q and above median free cash-flow and zero otherwise; Ln (Sales); Prior takeover interest: dummy 
variable which equals 1 if there has been any takeover interest in the year leading up to the PTP announcement; 
Price earnings ratio; Liquidity: Ratio of assets less stock on financial debt. 
 
4.2 United Kingdom 
 
In Panel A, the Institutional block-holder is part of a key element that characterizes UK Public to Private 
(Weir et al., 2005). This is confirmed by the result (0.69) which is higher compared to that observed for other blocks 
of the sample to Public Private (0.56 for the corporate block-holder; 0.51 for Family block). We also note that the 
Institutional block-holder plays an important role for the public to private and for corporate remained in stock 
quotation. However, we find that the latter is higher than observed in Europe. Moreover, the family block-holder is 
much less present in public to private in the United Kingdom than in Europe. However, no significance was found. 
The results are relatively near (0.64 for Public to Private against 0.84 for the control sample). We cannot confirm 
that this block-holder is one of PtoP characteristics. The takeover is significantly higher for PtoP companies, they 
are more subject to supply low growth prospects and liquidity compared to listed companies (0.85 against 1.47 for 
the growth prospects and 1.48 cons 2.02 for liquidity). They are ideal takeover targets.  
 
In panel B, the level of FCF, growth prospects and lack of liquidity are also three major elements that 
characterize PtoP. The results are broadly similar to those found in the rest of Europe.  
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Table 3: Results for UK (153 observations) 
Variables PtoP Mean Median SC Mean Median t value z statistic 
Panel A: Property and Control 
Managerial Ownership 0,51 1 0,68 1 -2,426** -2,387** 
Institutionnal Block-holder 0,69 1 0,81 1 -2,215** -2,134** 
Corporate Block-holder 0,56 1 0,65 1 -2,196** -2,102** 
Family Block-holder 0,51 0 0,53 1 -1,102 -1,006 
Takeover Defence 0,57 0 0,55 1 1,126 1,101 
       
Panel B: Performance 
Taxation 1,91 1,78 1,87 1,83 1,556 1,519 
Gearing 1,23 1,18 1,26 1,20 -1,272 -1,217 
Free Cash-flow 4,46 4,35 4,12 4,03 2,456** 2,418** 
Q ratio 0,85 0,79 1,47 1,38 -4,056*** -3,875*** 
Q1/Q2 0,97 0,92 1,12 1,08 -3,915*** -3,723*** 
Q1/Q3 0,83 0,77 1,22 1,17 -3,992*** -3,834*** 
LQ*HFCF 0,35 0,33 0,27 0,25 2,056** 1,998** 
PER 14,16 13,76 20,42 19,54 -2,385** -2,426** 
Liquidity 1,48 1,35 2,02 1,97 -2,582*** -2,569*** 
PtoP : Public to Private ; SC : Sample Control 
Notation: ***, **, * represent significance level up to 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 
Taxation: amount of taxation (%); Gearing: ratio between financials debt to shareholder funds, 
Managerial ownership: 1: when the equity held by managers represents over 25% of shares of the company; 0: 
otherwise; Institutional block-holder: 1: when the share of institutional shareholders is at least equal to 5% of 
shares of the company; 0: otherwise; Corporation block-holder: 1: when the share of corporation shareholders is at 
least equal to 5% of shares of the company; 0: otherwise; Family block-holder: 1: when the share of family 
shareholders is at least equal to 5% of shares of the company; 0: otherwise; Free Cash-flow: It is approximated by 
operating income before depreciation and amortization minus tax, interest and dividend payments (Lehn & Poulsen, 
1989); Q ratio: market capitalisation deflated by total assets; Q1/Q2: Q ratio in the year before going private (at the 
last published accounts) divided by the Q ratio in the previous year; Q1/Q3: Q ratio in the year before going private 
divided by the Q ratio two years before; LQ*HFCF: is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm had 
below median Q and above median free cash-flow and zero otherwise; Ln (Sales); Prior takeover interest: dummy 
variable which equals 1 if there has been any takeover interest in the year leading up to the PTP announcement; 
Price earnings ratio; Liquidity: Ratio of assets less stock on financial debt. 
 
4.3 United States 
 
In Panel A, the Corporate Block-holder and the institutional block-holder are two major elements that 
characterize public to private. We note that the institutional block-holder factor is the key control block-holder. It is 
both the highest of the panel but also the highest compared to other geographical areas. It can be understood by the 
fact that the institutional block-holder comprises Private Equity deals, which are in the United States, largely 
developed and invest heavily in these companies. The Family block-holder does not seem to explain the PtoP in the 
United States like in the United Kingdom. Taking control is also a feature of public to private in the U.S. This result 
is the highest of the four zones. In the case of the United States, we cannot invoke the lack of growth in the sense 
that companies cannot reach their level of development, because, it is a country that despite the crisis, is a growth 
engine. Nevertheless, we can justify it by the fact that in the United States many companies are created, but many 
also have financial difficulties and they are often bought instead of disappearing. 
 
In panel B, we also note that the level of FCF, growth prospects, underpricing and liquidity are all the four 
of important factors. Note that the results are higher than those we had observed in both Europe and the United 
Kingdom. Moreover, leverage is lower for companies than for PtoP remained in stock quotation. This is also true for 
Europe and the United Kingdom.  
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Table 4: Results for the USA (209 observations) 
Variables PtoP Mean Median SC Mean Median t value z statistic 
Panel A: Property and Control       
Managerial Ownership 0,54 1 0,62 1 -2,456** -2,417** 
Institutionnal Block-holder 0,72 1 0,92 1 -2,879*** -2,764*** 
Corporate Block-holder 0,64 1 0,89 1 -2,367** -2,298** 
Family Block-holder 0,49 1 0,52 0 -0,987 -0,873 
Takeover Defence 0,65 1 0,61 1 1,005 0,996 
       
Panel B: Performance       
Taxation 1,50 1,45 1,48 1,32 1,251 1,197 
Gearing 1,63 1,60 1,65 1,75 -1,145 -1,126 
Free Cash-flow 5,26 5,21 4,83 4,53 2,746*** 2,684*** 
Q ratio 0,77 0,71 1,53 1,44 -4,456*** -4,067*** 
Q1/Q2 0,85 0,78 1,15 1,09 -3,818*** -3,534*** 
Q1/Q3 0,81 0,72 1,26 1,21 -4,257*** -4,127*** 
LQ*HFCF 0,46 0,41 0,33 0,27 2,224** 2,158** 
PER 13,24 12,76 28,65 27,54 -3,547*** -3,468*** 
Liquidity 1,45 1,26 2,01 1,89 -2,652*** -2,592*** 
PtoP : Public to Private ; SC : Sample Control 
Notation: ***, **, * represent significance level up to 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 
Taxation: amount of taxation (%); Gearing: ratio between financials debt to shareholder funds, 
Managerial ownership: 1: when the equity held by managers represents over 25% of shares of the company; 0: 
otherwise; Institutional block-holder: 1: when the share of institutional shareholders is at least equal to 5% of 
shares of the company; 0: otherwise; Corporation block-holder: 1: when the share of corporation shareholders is at 
least equal to 5% of shares of the company; 0: otherwise; Family block-holder: 1: when the share of family 
shareholders is at least equal to 5% of shares of the company; 0: otherwise; Free Cash-flow: It is approximated by 
operating income before depreciation and amortization minus tax, interest and dividend payments (Lehn & Poulsen, 
1989); Q ratio: market capitalisation deflated by total assets; Q1/Q2: Q ratio in the year before going private (at the 
last published accounts) divided by the Q ratio in the previous year; Q1/Q3: Q ratio in the year before going private 
divided by the Q ratio two years before; LQ*HFCF: is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm had 
below median Q and above median free cash-flow and zero otherwise; Ln (Sales); Prior takeover interest: dummy 
variable which equals 1 if there has been any takeover interest in the year leading up to the PTP announcement; 
Price earnings ratio; Liquidity: Ratio of assets less stock on financial debt. 
 
4.4 Asia 
 
In Panel A, the institutional Block-holder and the corporate block-holder are both important elements 
relating to the ownership and control of public to private companies. We find that for Asia, like the United States, 
the Institutional block-holder is the most representative block-holder. This observation is also justified by the 
increase of corporate investments in Private Equity. The Family block is not significant. Taking defence in Asia is 
not a determining factor for the public to private companies. This is justified by the fact that the development of 
public to private is still very recent, which limit the abundant supply of redemptions as companies suffer in other 
geographical areas.  
 
In panel B, the same observation as the previous applies for Asia. We also note that the level of tax in Asia 
for PtoP is much higher than in other areas. In contrast, companies in PtoP have a low level of gearing relative to 
firms publicly traded. We also note that this difference is the most important of the entire sample. The tests for these 
two variables, taxation and gearing, appear very significant in Asia, in contrast to what we have observed in other 
areas.  
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Table 5: Results for Univariate Analysis for Asia (71 observations) 
Variables PtoP Mean Median SC Mean Median t value z statistic 
Panel A: Property and Control       
Managerial Ownership 0,61 1 0,78 1 -2,662*** -2,687*** 
Institutionnal Block-holder 0,62 1 0,85 1 -3,005*** -2,954*** 
Corporate Block-holder 0,63 1 0,79 1 -2,458** -2,397** 
Family Block-holder 0,53 0 0,55 0 -0,789 -0,654 
Takeover Defence 0,65 1 0,62 1 1,205 1,117 
       
Panel B: Performance       
Taxation 1,90 1,83 1,60 1,56 3,421*** 3,217*** 
Gearing 1,54 1,72 1,82 1,75 -2,896*** -2,746*** 
Free Cash-flow 4,23 4,02 3,97 3,83 4,569*** 4,327*** 
Q ratio 0,82 0,73 1,45 1,39 -4,787*** -4,654*** 
Q1/Q2 0,88 0,81 1,15 1,08 -3,956*** -3,872*** 
Q1/Q3 0,83 0,70 1,19 1,07 -4,362*** -4,317*** 
LQ*HFCF 0,42 0,40 0,28 0,25 2,178** 2,113** 
PER 16,45 15,92 26,36 25,73 -1,831* -1,729* 
Liquidity 1,49 1,35 2,05 1,88 -2,685*** -2,695*** 
PtoP : Public to Private; SC : Sample Control 
Notation: ***, **, * represent significance level up to 1%, 5% and 10%.  
 
Taxation: amount of taxation (%); Gearing: ratio between financials debt to shareholder funds, 
Managerial ownership: 1: when the equity held by managers represents over 25% of shares of the company; 0: 
otherwise; Institutional block-holder: 1: when the share of institutional shareholders is at least equal to 5% of 
shares of the company; 0: otherwise; Corporation block-holder: 1: when the share of corporation shareholders is at 
least equal to 5% of shares of the company; 0: otherwise; Family block-holder: 1: when the share of family 
shareholders is at least equal to 5% of shares of the company; 0: otherwise; Free Cash-flow: It is approximated by 
operating income before depreciation and amortization minus tax, interest and dividend payments (Lehn & Poulsen, 
1989); Q ratio: market capitalisation deflated by total assets; Q1/Q2: Q ratio in the year before going private (at the 
last published accounts) divided by the Q ratio in the previous year; Q1/Q3: Q ratio in the year before going private 
divided by the Q ratio two years before; LQ*HFCF: is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm had 
below median Q and above median free cash-flow and zero otherwise; Ln (Sales); Prior takeover interest: dummy 
variable which equals 1 if there has been any takeover interest in the year leading up to the PTP announcement; 
Price earnings ratio; Liquidity: Ratio of assets less stock on financial debt. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Tax Saving 
 
First, we note that there is undisputed evidence concerning the level of taxation and gearing. Indeed, we 
observe public to private companies have higher tax level than the listed companies. Moreover, the leverage of 
public to private companies is lower than those in control sample. This analysis confirms our hypothesis 1. 
However, these two variables are not significant. Only Asia has a high level of tax and a low gearing. These two 
variables are significant at 1% level.  
 
5.2 Realignment of interests 
 
In general, we find that the realignment of interests can explain why companies go out of quotation. Indeed, 
managers in the Public to Private are less represented (0.65 against 0.85 for the control sample of companies in 
Europe; 0.51 cons 0.68 for the United Kingdom; 0.54 cons 0.62 for the United States; 0.61 cons 0.78 for Asia) 
which proves that the corporation is not directed so efficiently and this leads to significant monitoring costs. 
Therefore, a stronger presence of managers within companies will realign the interests between actors. 
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5.3 Control 
 
For control, three blocks are studied: institutional, corporate and family block-holders. The presence of an 
important control will be an essential element to successful public to private; they will be well better directed. 
However we note that the family block-holder is more present in public to private transactions in Europe relative to 
other geographical areas. Indeed, the latter has a threshold of significance at 1% for family block-holder, which 
proves that the latter plays an important role in public to private transactions. This result confirms our analysis in the 
sense that Europe is the only geographical area in our sample where the industrial fabric of small and medium 
enterprises is the central link in industrial productivity: hence the presence of an important control within the Public 
to Private to optimize their performance. In general, the institutional block-holder holds the largest share and the 
greatest significance. This may justify the significant presence of institutional investors in corporate capital. Thus, 
the presence of a stronger control will allow the company to have better management. 
 
5.4 Free Cash-flow 
 
In line with our expectations, public to private have higher levels of Free Cash-flow much more important 
that company’s public. This indicates that the excess cash own by these companies can repay the debt. These 
positive results are confirmed with other studies (Renneboog, Simons, Wright (2006)) but they do not present 
significant results. Bo Becker, Joshua Pollet (2008) realise a study in the USA for the decision to go private and they 
obtain the same results as our study (a positive and significant link between going private and the level of free cash-
flow). 
 
5.5 Growth Prospects 
 
The results of the univariate analysis show that public to private firms has lower Q ratios than listed firms, 
whatever the geographical areas. In addition, we also note that the Q ratio of public to private was down compared 
to those observed in the previous two years (this result is confirmed with variables Q1/Q2, Q1/Q3), while deals 
remained in stock prices had important Q ratios. This shows that the companies have low growth prospects of PtoP 
and therefore the output of the rating may be a solution in terms of viability. In addition, results for LQ * HFCF are 
superior to the public to private firms owned compared to the control sample. Finally, firms in PtoP have the 
distinction of having low Q ratios and important levels of Free Cash-flow. 
 
5.6 Anti-Takeover 
 
We find that firms that are the subject of takeover are effective greater incentive to delist. Indeed, fear of 
being redeemed, managers prefer to leave the stock market. However this result is not significant in the sample 
whatever the geographical area. 
 
5.7 Undervaluation 
 
Concerning the under-valuation, the PtoP companies, as described in our hypothesis 7, are more 
undervalued in relation to listed companies. The difference is significant for all geographical areas and especially the 
United States who show a threshold of 1%.  
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5.8 Summary 
 
We summarize all our results in order to derive a profile of public to private that is to say the main features 
of PtoP operations and also a profile of PtoP from different geographical areas studied. Typical profile of a public to 
private of a general part and secondly a specific profile to geographical areas studied:  
 
• Low managerial share within firms 
• Low representation of control blocks 
• Significant cash-flow 
• Weak growth outlook 
• Undervalued company 
• Liquidity problem (low liquidity). 
 
Now, we show the typical profiles of public to private for each geographical area. For this, we consider only the 
most significant results of our study by geographic region. The selection of these specific characteristics area have 
been carried out taking into account both the results of the univariate analysis and those binary logistic regression.  
 
Table 6: Profile Of A Public To Private For Each Geographical Areas 
Countries Europe United Kingdom USA Asia 
Profiles Low managerial share 
Important role of Family 
Block 
Low representation of 
Corporate Block 
Low growth prospects 
Low liquidity 
Low managerial share 
Low importance of 
Family Block 
Importance of Free Cash-
flow 
Low Q ratio 
Low liquidity 
 
Very low share of Family 
Block 
Importance of FCF 
Low Q ratio 
Low liquidity 
Importance of level 
taxation (specific for 
Asia) 
Low gearing 
Low role of Institutional 
Block 
Importance of FCF 
Low Q ratio 
Low liquidity 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In the last years, there was an increase of public to private transactions in the world. For certain 
geographical areas this phenomenon is not new while for others this phenomenon is rather recent. The USA and the 
United Kingdom are the precursors, Europe countries have now more and more PtoP and Asia knows these 
transactions since the early 2000’s. To better understand this phenomenon, we realized an international empirical 
investigation to know the motivations of the companies to go private are. We show that low managerial share within 
societies, low representation of control blocks, significant cash-flow, weak growth outlook, undervalued company, 
liquidity problem are the main motivations for a company to delist. Moreover, our findings allowed us to construct a 
typical profile of a public to private transactions in each geographical area.   
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